

Pemberton Valley Evacuation Route Plan

Calian Nuclear Report VOP-0002-03

Version 4.0

14 September 2026

Presented to:

Village of Pemberton & Squamish-Lillooet Regional District

The Village of Pemberton is located within the unceded territory of Lílwat Nation and honours the language, culture and history of the Lílwat7ul.



The Squamish Lillooet Regional District is found within the traditional territories of several First Nations, including the Sk̓w̓x̓wú7mesh Úxwumixw (Squamish), St'át'imc and Lílwat Nations.

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
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUICK DECISION GUIDE	VIII
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 PURPOSE	1
1.2 SCOPE	1
1.3 ASSUMPTIONS	2
1.4 GUIDING PRINCIPLES	3
2. HAZARD ASSESSMENT AND EVACUATION IMPACTS	4
2.1 WILDLAND-URBAN INTERFACE FIRE	4
2.2 FLOODING	5
2.3 LANDSLIDE/DEBRIS FLOW	5
2.4 HAZARDOUS MATERIALS INCIDENT	6
2.5 EARTHQUAKE	6
2.6 STORM AND UTILITY FAILURE	7
2.7 CLIMATE CHANGE	7
3. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES	8
3.1 LOCAL AUTHORITY	8
3.2 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTRE (EOC)	8
3.3 FIRST RESPONDERS	9
3.4 MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION AND TRANSIT (MOTT)	9
3.5 EMERGENCY SUPPORT SERVICES (ESS)	9
3.6 FIRST NATIONS	10
3.7 PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITIES	10
3.8 SUPPORTING AGENCIES AND PARTNERS	10
3.8.1 BC Parks	11
3.8.2 BC Transit	11
3.8.3 Child Care Facilities	11
3.8.4 Schools and School Districts	11
3.9 PRIVATE AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS	12
3.9.1 Canadian Red Cross	12
3.9.2 Railway Operators	12
3.9.3 Pemberton Animal Well-being Society (PAWS)	12
3.9.4 Pemberton and District Chamber of Commerce	12
4. EVACUATION PRIORITIZATION	14
4.1 EVACUATION PRIORITIZATION FRAMEWORK	14
4.2 PRIORITY FACTORS	14
4.3 PHASED EVACUATION APPROACH	15
4.4 EVACUATION ZONES	15
4.5 LIVESTOCK EVACUATION CONSIDERATIONS	16
5. EVACUATION TRIGGERS AND DECISION FRAMEWORK	17
5.1 PURPOSE OF EVACUATION TRIGGERS	17
5.2 TRIGGER LEVELS	17
6. ROUTE SELECTION FRAMEWORK	19
6.1 ROUTE HIERARCHY	19
6.2 PRIMARY ROUTE: HIGHWAY 99 (SEA TO SKY HIGHWAY)	19
6.3 SECONDARY ROUTE: HIGHWAY 99 (DUFFEY LAKE ROAD)	20

6.4	RELATIONSHIP WITH EVACUATION TRIGGERS	21
6.5	TRANSITION TO ROAD ASSESSMENT	21
7.	ROAD ASSESSMENT PROCESS.....	22
7.1	REQUIREMENT FOR ROAD ASSESSMENT.....	22
7.2	ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.....	22
7.3	ASSESSMENT PRIORITIZATION.....	23
7.4	ASSESSMENT STEPS.....	23
7.5	ROUTE STATUS CATEGORIES.....	23
7.6	ASSESSMENT REFERENCE SYSTEM.....	24
7.7	ONGOING REASSESSMENT AND UPDATES	24
8.	TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AND EVACUATION EXECUTION	26
8.1	TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES	26
8.2	TRAFFIC CONTROL AND ROUTE MANAGEMENT.....	26
8.2.1	<i>Traffic Control Points</i>	26
8.2.2	<i>Flow Management Considerations</i>	26
8.3	TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT AND ASSISTED EVACUATION.....	27
8.3.1	<i>General Principles</i>	27
8.3.2	<i>Assisted Transportation</i>	27
8.4	COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION DURING EVACUATION	27
8.5	RE-ENTRY CONTROL (DURING EVACUATION PHASE)	28
9.	VULNERABLE POPULATIONS.....	29
9.1	IDENTIFICATION OF VULNERABLE POPULATIONS.....	29
9.2	CHILD CARE FACILITIES.....	29
9.3	INDIVIDUALS WITH MOBILITY OR FUNCTIONAL NEEDS	30
9.4	OUT-PATIENTS AND COMMUNITY-BASED HEALTH CARE CLIENTS	30
9.5	INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT ACCESS TO PRIVATE VEHICLES.....	31
9.6	VISITORS AND TOURISTS	31
9.7	COMMUNICATIONS AND SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS	31
10.	REUNIFICATION AND RECEPTION.....	32
10.1	PRIMARY REUNIFICATION AND RECEPTION CENTRE.....	32
10.2	RECEPTION OPERATIONS	32
10.3	REGISTRATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY	33
10.4	REUNIFICATION CONSIDERATIONS	33
10.5	ALTERNATE RECEPTION LOCATIONS.....	34
10.6	COMMUNICATION AT RECEPTION SITES	34
11.	COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY.....	35
11.1	COMMUNICATION OBJECTIVES	35
11.2	EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION METHODS.....	35
11.2.1	<i>Primary Notification Methods</i>	35
11.2.2	<i>Supplementary Notification Methods</i>	36
11.3	AUTHORITY AND MESSAGE CONTROL	36
11.4	ALERT AND ORDER MESSAGING.....	36
11.5	ROUTE-SPECIFIC COMMUNICATIONS.....	37
11.6	LIMITATIONS AND REDUNDANCY	37
12.	TRAINING, EXERCISES, AND MAINTENANCE	39
12.1	TRAINING.....	39
12.2	EXERCISES	39
12.3	INCORPORATION OF LESSONS IDENTIFIED.....	40

12.4	PLAN REVIEW AND UPDATES	40
12.5	ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PLAN MAINTENANCE.....	40
12.6	RECORD OF REVISIONS	41
ANNEX A.	EVACUATION ZONE MAPS AND PROFILES	42
A.1	EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES.....	42
A.2	MAP MAINTENANCE AND UPDATES	43
A.3	EVACUATION ZONE OVERVIEW.....	43
A.4	VOP EVACUATION ZONE MAPS.....	45
A.4.1	Zone VOP 1: Downtown West	45
A.4.2	Zone VOP 2: Downtown East.....	48
A.4.3	Zone VOP 3: The Ridge & Industrial Complex.....	50
A.4.4	Zone VOP 4: Airport & Golf Courses.....	53
A.5	SLRD AREA C EVACUATION ZONE MAPS.....	56
A.5.1	Zone SLRD 1: Pemberton Meadows.....	56
A.5.2	Zone SLRD 2: Pemberton Central.....	59
A.5.3	Zone SLRD 3: Pemberton Fringe South	61
A.5.4	Zone SLRD 4: Mount Currie.....	63
A.5.5	Zone SLRD 5: Owl Creek.....	65
A.5.6	Zone SLRD 6: Wedgewoods Subdivision	67
A.5.7	Zone SLRD 7: Birken.....	69
A.5.8	Zone SLRD 8: Lillooet Lake Estates.....	72
ANNEX B.	ROAD ASSESSMENT TOOLS	74
B.1	ROAD ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST	74
B.2	ROAD ASSSSMENT FORM.....	75
B.3	ROUTE STATUS SUMMARY SHEET.....	76
ANNEX C.	DECISION AIDS.....	77
C.1	ZONE ACTIVATION QUICK REFERENCE.....	77
C.2	ROUTE SELECTION QUICK REFERENCE	77
C.3	DECISION CONFIRMATION CHECKLIST.....	78
ANNEX D.	COMMUNICATIONS TEMPLATES	79
D.1	EVACUATION ALERT MESSAGE TEMPLATE	79
D.2	EVACUATION ORDER MESSAGE TEMPLATE	79
D.3	WILDFIRE EVACUATION MESSAGING ADD-ON	80
D.4	FLOODING/ROAD CONDITION MESSAGING ADD-ON	80
D.5	MESSAGE CONTROL CHECKLIST.....	80
ANNEX E.	ASSISTED EVACUATION AND VULNERABLE POPULATION TOOLS	81
E.1	ASSISTED EVACUATION DECISION QUICK REFERENCE.....	81
E.2	ASSISTED EVACUATION REQUEST LOG	82
E.3	VULNERABLE POPULATION IDENTIFICATION SHEET.....	83
E.4	PICK-UP/MUSTER POINT TRACKING SHEET.....	84
E.5	TRANSPORTATION RESOURCE TRACKER.....	85
ANNEX F.	LIVESTOCK EVACUATION PLAN	86
F.1	SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS.....	86
F.2	EVACUATION TRIGGERS FOR LIVESTOCK.....	86
F.3	LIVESTOCK EVACUATION ACTIONS.....	86
F.4	COORDINATION AND INFORMATION SHARING.....	87
F.5	PUBLIC MESSAGING CONSIDERATIONS	87
F.6	LIMITATIONS	87

ANNEX G. ACRONYMS..... 88**LIST OF TABLES**

Table 1: WUI Fire Evacuation Impacts	4
Table 2: Flooding Evacuation Impacts.....	5
Table 3: Landslide/Debris Flow Evacuation Impacts.....	5
Table 4: Hazardous Materials Evacuation Impacts	6
Table 5: Earthquake Evacuation Impacts.....	6
Table 6: Storm and Utility Failure Evacuation Impacts.....	7
Table 7: Evacuation Trigger Levels.....	18
Table 8: Primary Route Planning Details	20
Table 9: Secondary Route Planning Details.....	20
Table 10: Road Assessment Steps	23
Table 11: Road Status Categories	24
Table 12: Reception Operations	33
Table 13: Reunification Considerations	33
Table 14: Alert and Order Messaging.....	37
Table 15: Record of Revisions.....	41
Table 16: Zone VOP 1 - Downtown West Profile	45
Table 17: Zone VOP 2 - Downtown East Profile	48
Table 18: Zone VOP 3 - The Ridge & Industrial Complex Profile	50
Table 19: Zone VOP 4 - Airport and Golf Courses Profile.....	53
Table 20: Zone SLRD 1 - Pemberton Meadows Profile.....	56
Table 21: Zone SLRD 2 - Pemberton Central Profile.....	59
Table 22: Zone SLRD 3 - Pemberton Fringe South Profile	61
Table 23: Zone SLRD 4 - Mount Currie Profile.....	63
Table 24: Zone SLRD 5 - SLRD Owl Creek Profile	65
Table 25: Zone SLRD 6 - Wedgewoods Subdivision Profile.....	67
Table 26: Zone SLRD 7 - Birken Profile	69
Table 27: Zone SLRD 8 - Lillooet Lake Estates Profile	72
Table 28: Road Assessment Checklist.....	74
Table 29: Road Assessment Form	75
Table 30: Route Status Summary	76
Table 31: Zone Activation Reference	77
Table 32: Route Selection Reference	77
Table 33: Decision Confirmation Checklist.....	78
Table 34: Message Control Checklist.....	80
Table 35: Assisted Evacuation Request Log	82
Table 36: Vulnerable Population Identification Sheet.....	83
Table 37: Muster Point Tracking Sheet.....	84
Table 38: Transportation Resource Tracker.....	85
Table 39: Acronyms.....	88

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Evacuation Activation and Notification Workflow	ix
Figure 2: First Nations Communications in Evacuation Planning	x
Figure 3: Evacuation Zone Overview.....	44
Figure 4: Zone VOP 1 - Downtown West Map.....	47
Figure 5: Zone VOP 2 - Downtown East Map.....	49
Figure 6: Zone VOP 3 - The Ridge & Industrial Complex Map.....	52
Figure 7: Zone VOP 4 - Airport and Golf Courses Map	55
Figure 8: Zone SLRD 1 - Pemberton Meadows Map	58
Figure 9: Zone SLRD 2 - Pemberton Central Map	60
Figure 10: Zone SLRD 3 - Pemberton Fringe South Map	62
Figure 11: Zone SLRD 4 - Mount Currie Map.....	64
Figure 12: Zone SLRD 5 - SLRD Owl Creek Profile.....	66
Figure 13: Zone SLRD 6 - Wedgewoods Subdivision Map.....	68
Figure 14: Zone SLRD 7 - Birken Map	71
Figure 15: Zone SLRD 8 - Lillooet Lake Estates Map	73

QUICK DECISION GUIDE

The following workflow in Figure 1 summarizes the escalation process used to support evacuation planning and implementation within the Pemberton Valley. Beginning with the assessment of evacuation triggers, the workflow outlines the progression through evacuation monitoring, evacuation alert, and evacuation order activation levels, including the key actions associated with at each level and the roles of Incident Command, the Emergency Program Coordinator (EPC), the Emergency Operations Centre (EOC), and response partners. It is intended to complement the detailed procedures contained within this Evacuation Route Plan regardless of scale of evacuation.




Figure 1: Evacuation Activation and Notification Workflow

To support emergency planning and decision-making under the Emergency Disaster Management Act (EDMA), First Nations (FN) engagement should be integrated throughout evacuation preparedness, response, and recovery activities. The flow chart in Figure 2 summarizes the FN communication and consultation process, highlighting key coordination points, decision-making requirements, and ongoing information sharing during an evacuation event.




Figure 2: First Nations Communications in Evacuation Planning

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose

The purpose of this Evacuation Route Plan is to provide a structured, operational framework to guide evacuation decision-making and execution in the Pemberton Valley. The plan supports emergency management personnel, leadership, and partner agencies in making timely, coordinated decisions to project life safety during emergency events.

The plan also supports the estimation of evacuation feasibility and timing under a range of hazard conditions to inform operational planning and decision-making.

This plan establishes:

- A clear understanding of hazards that may trigger evacuations;
- A decision-making framework for determining when evacuation actions are required;
- Defined evacuation zones and prioritization approaches;
- A process to assess route viability prior to authorizing movement;
- Guidance for traffic management, transportation support and evacuation execution; and
- Direction for coordinated public communication during evacuation events.

This plan is intended to function as a practical, field informed tool that integrates hazard awareness, route conditions, and operational constraints to support safe and efficient evacuation outcomes.

1.2 Scope

This plan applies to the Village of Pemberton (VOP) and communities within the Squamish-Lillooet Regional District (SLRD) Electoral Area C, collectively referred to as the Pemberton Valley.

This plan is focused on route-based evacuation and addresses:

- Identification and use of primary and secondary evacuation routes;
- Constraints affecting evacuation movement (e.g., road capacity, hazard impacts, seasonal access);
- Decision-making related to evacuation timing, phasing, and prioritization; and
- Operational coordination required to move people safely out of hazard-affected areas.

This plan is intended to support evacuations resulting from a range of hazards, including but not limited to:

- Wildland-urban interface (WUI) fire;

- Flooding;
- Landslide or debris flow;
- Hazardous materials incidents; and
- Infrastructure disruption or failure.

This plan does not replace local Emergency Plans or Emergency Support Services (ESS) plans. Rather, it provides a supporting function focused specifically on evacuation routing, movement, and execution.

The following First Nations were reached out to during the development of this plan:

- Lílwat Nation
- N'Quatqua First Nation
- Samahquam First Nation
- Lillooet Tribal Council
- Xaxli'p First Nation
- Xwísten First Nation
- T'ít'q'et First Nation
- Skatin First Nation
- Xa'xtsa (Douglas First Nation)

It is expected that the VOP and SLRD will continue to engage with all relevant FNs during any future updates to this plan, as well as during emergencies.

1.3 Assumptions

The following assumptions informed the development of this plan and should be considered during its application:

- The Pemberton Valley relies on Highway 99 for evacuation, with limited and constrained alternative options;
- Population levels fluctuate due to tourism and seasonal use, increasing evacuation demand;
- Certain populations within the Pemberton Valley, including visitors, seasonal workers, transient individuals, and other vulnerable persons, may have limited access to emergency alerts, transportation, or communication services and may require targeted notification and evacuation support;
- Evacuations will generally be conducted in phases based on hazard conditions and route capacity;
- Route conditions may change rapidly and require ongoing reassessment during evacuation operations;
- Warning time will vary by hazard, ranging from advance notice to immediate evacuation; and
- Most evacuations will be vehicle-based, with alternative methods used where necessary.

1.4 Guiding Principles

This Evacuation Route Plan is guided by the following principles:

- **Life Safety First:** Protection of life is the primary objective in all evacuation decisions and actions;
- **Timely Decision-Making:** Evacuation triggers and decision frameworks support early, proactive and evidence-based decision-making;
- **Collaboration with FNs:** Evacuation planning, preparedness, and response activities should be undertaken in partnership with FNs whose communities, interests, rights, and traditional territories may be affected by hazards or evacuation operations;
- **Phased and Flexible Approach:** Evacuations should be staged and prioritized to reduce congestion, maintain route functionality, and support safe movement;
- **Route-Driven Decision-Making:** Evacuation actions are dependent on route viability. All evacuation decisions must consider current and projected route conditions;
- **Situational Awareness:** Real-time information, including hazard behaviour and road assessments, is essential to inform decisions and adjust operations;
- **Accessibility and Inclusivity:** Special consideration is given to vulnerable populations and visitors unfamiliar with the area.
- **Clarity in Communication:** Public messaging must be clear, consistent, and aligned with authorized routes and evacuation instructions; and
- **Support for Vulnerable Populations:** Additional consideration must be given to individuals requiring assistance, including those with mobility challenges, limited access to transportation, or unfamiliarity with the area.

The following sections translate these principles into operational guidance, including hazard considerations, evacuation triggers, route selection, and execution requirements.

2. HAZARD ASSESSMENT AND EVACUATION IMPACTS

The Pemberton Valley is exposed to a range of natural, environmental, and infrastructure-related hazards that may trigger evacuation events. These hazards present varying levels of risk to life safety and directly influence the feasibility, timing, and method of evacuation.

Given the Pemberton Valley's reliance on a limited transportation network (i.e., Highway 99), hazard impacts must be evaluated in terms of their ability to:

- Disrupt or degrade evacuation routes;
- Limit visibility or travel speed;
- Isolate specific evacuation zones; and
- Require immediate evacuation or time-sensitive evacuation actions.

This section outlines key hazards and their associated impacts on evacuation operations.

2.1 Wildland-Urban Interface Fire

WUI fire is a significant hazard within the Valley, particularly in forested and semi-rural communities where structures are adjacent to natural fuel sources. Regional Hazard, Risk, and Vulnerability Analysis (HRVA) data identifies interface fire as recurring and increasing risk with evacuation considerations detailed in Table 1.

Table 1: WUI Fire Evacuation Impacts

Impact	Description
Road Exposure	Highway 99 and local access roads may be threatened or closed due to fire activity
Reduced Visibility	Smoke reduces visibility, slowing evacuation and increasing collision risk
Rapid Fire Spread	Fire behaviour may result in limited evacuation time
Ember Ignition	Spot fires may develop ahead of the fire front, affecting routes and communities
Operational Considerations	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evacuations are likely to be phased and may escalate quickly • Early alerting is critical due to potential rapid fire spread • Route viability must be continuously monitored • Smoke impacts may significantly slow evacuation movement 	

2.2 Flooding

Flooding is one of the most significant hazards in the Pemberton Valley due to its location on a floodplain and proximity to major river systems. Evacuation impacts are detailed in Table 2.

Table 2: Flooding Evacuation Impacts

Impact	Description
Road Inundation	Key routes, including Pemberton Meadows Road and local access roads, may flood, limiting or preventing access to neighbourhoods that rely on a single route for entry and evacuation
Route Loss	Washouts or overtopping may render routes impassable
Isolation	Communities may become cut off as water levels rise
Extended Duration	Flood conditions may persist, delaying evacuation or re-entry
Operational Considerations	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evacuation may need to occur prior to peak flood conditions • Route assessments are critical due to potential washouts • Phased evacuation may be required due to limited route capacity • Flooding may limit access for response and evacuation support 	

2.3 Landslide/Debris Flow

Geotechnical hazards, including landslides and debris flows, are a key risk in the Pemberton Valley due to steep terrain and unstable slopes. Evacuation impacts are outlined in Table 3.

Table 3: Landslide/Debris Flow Evacuation Impacts

Impact	Description
Sudden Route Blockage	Debris may immediately block evacuation routes
Cascading Events	Landslides may trigger flooding or secondary slope failures, and increased instability in post-wildfire burn scar areas
Limited Warning	Events may occur with minimal notice
Infrastructure Damage	Roads and bridges may be damaged or destroyed
Operational Considerations	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evacuation timing may be constrained by sudden hazard onset • Route redundancy is limited, increasing risk of isolation • Affected areas may require alternative evacuation strategies 	

- Continuous monitoring is required where possible

2.4 Hazardous Materials Incident

Hazardous materials incidents may occur along major transportation corridors within the Pemberton Valley with impacts summarized in Table 4.

Table 4: Hazardous Materials Evacuation Impacts

Impact	Description
Localized Evacuation	Hazard zones may require immediate evacuation
Route Restrictions	Contamination or exclusion zones may limit route use
Rapid-Onset Conditions	Minimal warning time for evacuation
Access Control	Movement controlled by emergency responders
Operational Considerations	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evacuations are typically localized but urgent • Route selection must avoid contaminated areas • Strong coordination with responders is required 	

2.5 Earthquake

Earthquake hazard exists throughout the region, with potential for significant infrastructure impacts despite relatively lower frequency. Evacuation details for earthquakes are summarized in Table 5.

Table 5: Earthquake Evacuation Impacts

Impact	Description
Infrastructure Damage	Roads, bridges and utilities may be compromised
Network Disruption	Multiple routes may be affected simultaneously
Communication Failure	Systems may be degraded or unavailable
Uncoordinated Movement	Immediate self-evacuation may cause congestion
Operational Considerations	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Little or no warning time • Evacuation may be delayed pending route assessment • Response may occur with limited situational awareness • Life safety actions may precede coordinated evacuation 	

2.6 Storm and Utility Failure

Severe weather events, including windstorms and heavy precipitation, regularly impact the region. These impacts are outlined in Table 6.

Table 6: Storm and Utility Failure Evacuation Impacts

Impact	Description
Debris on Roads	Fallen trees and infrastructure block routes
Reduced Visibility	Adverse weather slows evacuation
Power Outages	Impacts communication and coordination
Isolation	Communities may become temporarily cut off
Operational Considerations	
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Evacuation may proceed at reduced speed• Road clearance may be required prior to movement• Communication challenges should be anticipated• Some communities may rely on independent infrastructure	

2.7 Climate Change

Climate change is expected to increase the frequency and severity of several hazards affecting the Pemberton Valley, including wildfires, flooding, and landslides. These changes may reduce predictability, increase the likelihood of cascading hazards, and place greater pressure on evacuation routes and decision-making processes.

3. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

This section outlines key functions related to evacuation decision-making, route management, and operational support within the Pemberton Valley.

Roles may vary depending on the nature and scale of the event; however, the responsibilities below represent core functions during evacuation operations.

3.1 Local Authority

The VOP and SLRD, and neighbouring FNs are responsible for emergency management within their respective jurisdictions. Each maintains its own emergency management program, authority, and emergency operations structure. Evacuation planning, alerts orders, and response activities are undertaken by the authority having jurisdiction, with coordinating occurring between local governments, FNs, provincial agencies, and other partners as required.

Responsibilities include:

- Determining when evacuation alerts and orders are issued within their jurisdiction;
- Establishing evacuation priorities, timing, and phasing;
- Activating and managing the Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) as applicable;
- Confirming evacuation routes based on hazard conditions and route assessments;
- Coordinating traffic management strategies and resource deployment;
- Issuing public information and evacuation instructions; and
- Coordinating with FNs, provincial agencies, neighbouring jurisdictions, and other response partners.

3.2 Emergency Operations Centre (EOC)

The EOC supports coordination, situational awareness, and decision-making during evacuation events.

Responsibilities include:

- Maintaining situational awareness of hazard conditions, and evacuation route status;
- Supporting evacuation decision-making, including triggers, timing, and prioritization;
- Coordinating resources such as transportation, traffic control, and field support;
- Managing public information and coordinated messaging; and
- Liaising with first responders, technical experts, and external partners (i.e., Pemberton Valley Dyking District (PVDD), Vancouver Coastal Health (VCH), BC Wildfire Service (BCWS)).

3.3 First Responders

First responders (i.e., Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), BC Ambulance, local fire services) support the implementation of evacuation operations and ensure public safety in the field. The extent of support provided may vary based on resource availability, incident complexity, and competing operational priorities.

Responsibilities include:

- Conducting evacuation notifications where required;
- Establishing and maintaining traffic control measures where resources permit;
- Managing safe movement along evacuation routes;
- Assisting with evacuation of vulnerable populations;
- Securing evacuated areas and controlling re-entry; and
- Providing real-time updates on conditions to the EOC.

3.4 Ministry of Transportation and Transit (MOTT)

MOTT is responsible for the operation and maintenance of provincial transportation infrastructure, including Highway 99, and other transportation-related infrastructure under provincial jurisdiction.

Responsibilities include:

- Assessing road conditions and identifying hazards or constraints;
- Providing updates on road status, closures, and capacity;
- Supporting traffic management measures on provincial routes; and
- Coordinating with local authorities to confirm route viability prior to evaluation.

3.5 Emergency Support Services (ESS)

ESS provides support to evacuees during and after evacuation.

Responsibilities include:

- Establishing and operating Reception Centres (RCs);
- Providing food, lodging, and basic necessities;
- Supporting evacuee registration and tracking; and
- Assisting with reunification and referrals for ongoing needs.

3.6 First Nations

FNs within the Pemberton Valley are key partners in evacuation planning and response.

Responsibilities may include:

- Making evacuation decisions within their jurisdictions;
- Coordinating evacuation activities and resource sharing;
- Providing local knowledge and situational awareness; and
- Coordinating with local authorities and EOCs during regional events.

3.7 Public Responsibilities

Residents and visitors play an essential role in safe evacuation.

Responsibilities include:

- Following evacuation alerts, orders, and official instructions;
- Using designated evacuation routes;
- Preparing in advance with emergency plans and supplies; and
- Avoiding unnecessary travel that may interfere with evacuation operations.

3.8 Supporting Agencies and Partners

Additional agencies may support hazard mitigation, preparedness, response, and evacuation operations depending on the hazard end event type. Local agencies are included in response activities at the discretion of local governments, using formal notification and request mechanisms through the EOC.

These may include:

- **BCWS:** Provides hazard intelligence, fire behaviour, and operational updates;
- **BC Ministry of Emergency Management and Climate Readiness (EMCR):** Provides provincial coordination and support;
- **BC Ministry of Water, Land and Resource Stewardship (WLRS):** Supports hazard assessment, monitoring, and mitigation activities on Crown Land, including landslide and slope instability risks that may affect evacuation routes and public safety;
- **Pemberton Search and Rescue (PSAR):** Supports evacuation operations across urban, rural, and backcountry areas by assisting with perimeter sweeps, notifications, welfare checks, access in constrained or hazardous areas, and providing field observations to the EOC;
- **BC Hydro and Utility Providers:** Provide infrastructure status and restoration updates;
- **Sea to Sky Community Services:** Manage supports for vulnerable populations;

- **VCH:** Manage and provide information on health facilities; and
- **Volunteer Organizations:** Support logistics and coordination functions.

3.8.1 BC Parks

- Coordinating provincial park and campground closures, visitor notifications, and on-site evacuations in accordance with Emergency Response Plans (ERPs);
- Providing situational awareness regarding provincial park conditions, visitor volumes, and access constraints; and
- Coordinating with local authorities, the EOC, RCMP, and other responders to align park evacuations with broader community evacuation actions and authorized routes.

3.8.2 BC Transit

- Reallocating vehicles from surrounding transit systems to increase transportation capacity for evacuations in the Pemberton Valley; and
- Providing situational awareness regarding vehicle availability, passenger capacity, routes, and operational constraints to emergency management partners.

3.8.3 Child Care Facilities

- Coordinating the reunification, pick-up, and continued supervision of children in care upon an Evacuation Alert until they are collected by a parent, guardian, or other authorized individual;
- Coordinating with emergency management partners to support the safe transfer of children in their care;
- Providing situational awareness to emergency management officials regarding the status of children and facility operations, as appropriate; and
- Making available facilities and equipment to support evacuation and emergency response operations, when feasible.

3.8.4 Schools and School Districts

- May support the movement of evacuees through a fleet of school buses, including locally based buses and additional district resources that may be deployed from other communities;
- Utilizing school facilities and operations equipment to support evacuation and emergency response operations, when available; and
- Providing situational awareness regarding transportation capacity, school facility availability, and operational constraints.

3.9 Private and Non-Governmental Organizations

Community-based organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and non-profits, are often closest to vulnerable community members and those with higher support needs. Their trusted relationships and services mandates make them essential partners in preparedness, evacuation, and recovery efforts, particularly when formal systems are under strain.

3.9.1 Canadian Red Cross

- Delivering services on behalf of local ESS partners within the Pemberton Valley through formal service agreements; and
- Recruiting, training, and maintaining a roster of volunteers to support emergency response activities, including RC operations.

3.9.2 Railway Operators

- Providing rail-based evacuation and logistical support only when rail infrastructure is adequately maintained and deemed safe for service;
- Conducting or supporting rail line assessments to verify that tracks and related infrastructure are safe for operational use during an emergency; and
- Coordinating with emergency management agencies and local authorities to determine feasibility, timing, and operational requirements for rail support activities.

3.9.3 Pemberton Animal Well-being Society (PAWS)

- Supporting the safe evacuation of animals through volunteer-assisted transport and the provision of animal transport crates;
- Supporting evacuees with pets by providing animal care supplies and coordinating temporary sheltering and care for cats and dogs, subject to available resources and capacity;
- Maintaining and implementing organizational evacuation plans for animals in care, including relocation to partner shelters outside the affected area; and
- Supporting emergency management partners by identifying available animal welfare resources, supplies, and sheltering capacity, as appropriate.

3.9.4 Pemberton and District Chamber of Commerce

- Serving as a liaison between local authorities and the business community by sharing evacuation, re-entry, and other emergency information, while relaying business needs and concerns to emergency management partners;
- Facilitating business-to-business coordination and providing information on local contacts, facilities, and resources that may support emergency response and recovery operations to local emergency management partners; and

- Supporting business continuity and recovery by communicating re-entry requirements, timelines, and available support during and after an evacuation.

4. EVACUATION PRIORITIZATION

Evacuation zones and prioritization provide the foundation for managing evacuation operations in the Pemberton Valley. This approach supports phased evacuation, reduces congestion on limited transportation routes, and ensures that those at greatest risk are prioritized for movement based on hazard conditions and route availability.

4.1 Evacuation Prioritization Framework

Evacuation prioritization is determined through a structured assessment of hazard conditions, population risk, and evacuation feasibility. This framework is designed to support timely, defensible decision-making under evolving conditions and to enable phased evacuation where appropriate.

Prioritization decisions are informed by a combination of:

- Hazard type, severity, and expected progression;
- Geographic exposure and proximity to the hazard;
- Population vulnerability;
- Evacuation time requirements; and
- Evacuation route availability, condition, and risk of isolation.

Evacuation prioritization is directly influenced by route viability. Areas or zones that are at risk of losing access to evacuation routes, or that may become isolated due to deteriorating conditions, may be prioritized for early evacuation.

The evacuation prioritization framework informs:

- The timing and sequencing of evacuation alerts and orders;
- Selection of evacuation routes (primary or secondary);
- Road assessment priorities; and
- Traffic management and staging strategies.

Evacuation routes are confirmed through the road assessment and route selection processes outlined in Annex B. Prioritization decisions are reviewed continuously throughout evacuation operations.

4.2 Priority Factors

The following factors are used to guide evacuation prioritization decisions:

- Immediate life safety risk;
- Presence and concentration of vulnerable populations;

- Distance from safe areas or evacuation routes;
- Likelihood of route degradation or isolation;
- Current and projected evacuation route conditions, including route accessibility, capacity, congestion, travel times, and the potential for the hazard to affect evacuation routes; and/or
- Population density and anticipated evacuation demand.

No single factor determines priority on its own. Decision-makers consider these factors collectively and reassess priorities as conditions change. Evacuation decisions should also consider whether movement may expose evacuees to greater risk than remaining in place or sheltering in a safer location until conditions improve.

4.3 Phased Evacuation Approach

Phased evacuation may be used to:

- Reduce congestion on evacuation routes;
- Prioritize movement of populations at greatest risk;
- Maintain access for emergency responders and assessment teams; and
- Support more controlled and efficient evacuation movement.

Phasing decisions are informed by hazard behaviour, road assessment outcomes, and available transportation capacity. Phased evacuation may be adjusted or accelerated as conditions evolve.

4.4 Evacuation Zones

The Pemberton Valley is divided into twelve evacuation zones, four under the jurisdiction of the VOP and eight under the jurisdiction of the SLRD.

Evacuation zones are used to:

- Support phased evacuation;
- Inform public messaging and notifications; and
- Clearly identify areas subject to evacuation alerts and orders.

Evacuation zones are intended to support phased and large-scale evacuations. During localized incidents, hazard-specific evacuation areas may be established that do not align directly with predefined evacuation zones.

Certain evacuation zones within the Pemberton Valley include significant agricultural and livestock operations, which may influence evacuation timing and sequencing.

Zone maps and profiles can be found in Annex A.

4.5 Livestock Evacuation Considerations

In agricultural areas of the Pemberton Valley, livestock evacuation requirements may influence evacuation timing, prioritization, and sequencing. Livestock movement typically requires additional warning time, specialized equipment (e.g., trailers), and route availability, and may not be feasible during late-stage or rapid on-set events.

Where sufficient warning time exists, evacuation decisions for areas with significant livestock operations may need to be initiated earlier than adjacent residential areas to reduce the risk of isolation and loss of access. These considerations are applied alongside human life-safety priorities, route viability, and overall evacuation feasibility.

Operational guidance for livestock evacuation is provided in Annex F, and should be considered during evacuation prioritization, trigger escalation, and route assessment for applicable zones.

5. EVACUATION TRIGGERS AND DECISION FRAMEWORK

This section establishes the conditions under which evacuation actions are initiated, escalated, or modified within the Pemberton Valley. Evacuation triggers link hazard conditions, route viability, and population risk to expected decision-making actions, providing a consistent framework for evacuation decisions under evolving conditions.

Evacuation triggers are intended to support timely, proactive decision-making and may be implemented non-sequentially depending on the hazard type, speed of onset, and available warning time.

5.1 Purpose of Evacuation Triggers

Evacuation triggers are used to:

- Support consistent decision-making across agencies and jurisdictions;
- Align evacuation actions with hazard severity and escalation;
- Ensure evacuation routes are assessed and authorized before movement occurs where time allows;
- Support timely information sharing and coordination with affected FNs and partner organizations throughout the evacuation decision-making process; and
- Provide a common reference point for EOC briefings and operational coordination.

Trigger levels do not replace professional judgement. Decision-makers must apply this framework with flexibility based on real-time conditions.

5.2 Trigger Levels

Evacuation decisions are guided by three escalating levels outlined in Table 7 that link observed conditions to expected actions. These levels are designed to function as a quick reference during incidents, including EOC operations and field coordination.

Table 7: Evacuation Trigger Levels

Level and Purpose	Indicators	Actions
Level 1 – Monitoring: Increase situational awareness and prepare for possible evacuation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hazard identified through monitoring, forecasts, or reports • No immediate threat to life safety • Evacuation routes believed to be viable but unconfirmed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhanced monitoring of hazard conditions • Internal coordination and readiness checks • Initiate information sharing and situational awareness discussions with technical experts (i.e., BCWS, PVDD), potentially affected FNs and other key partners • Drafting of Evacuation Alerts • Pre-positioning of traffic control or response resources • Initiate road assessment planning
Level 2 – Evacuation Alert: Provide advance notice to populations likely to be affected and prepare for evacuation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hazard conditions worsening or moving toward the community • Increased likelihood of route degradation or isolation • Limited time available to complete assessments or coordination 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Issue Evacuation Alerts for affected zones • Initiate coordination calls with partner organizations • Initiate road assessment • Begin traffic management planning • Prepare vulnerable population evacuation • Notify registered farm operators of available ESS to support early voluntary evacuation of livestock, personnel, and farm operations where appropriate • Provide advanced notification to affected FNs to support awareness, preparedness, and coordination activities
Level 3 – Evacuation Order: Direct immediate movement away from hazard-affected areas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Significant threat to life safety • Confirmed or imminent impact to evacuation routes (in consideration of expected time to execute Order) • Risk assessments indicate that the risk associated with remaining in the affected area outweigh the risks associated with evacuation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Issue Evacuation Order for specified zones • Activate authorized evacuation routes • Deploy traffic control and responder support • Continue reassessment of route conditions throughout evacuation • Maintain ongoing information sharing with affected FNs regarding evacuation status, route conditions, and operational considerations

6. ROUTE SELECTION FRAMEWORK

Route selection decisions are informed by the evacuation trigger level, hazard conditions, and the results of road assessments. As trigger levels escalate, tolerance for route risk decreases and greater emphasis is placed on confirmed route viability and safety.

This section establishes a clear, condition-based framework for selecting evacuation routes once an evacuation decision has been made. It defines:

- The hierarchy of evacuation routes;
- Conditions under which routes may be authorized, restricted, or closed; and
- The role of route assessment in approving evacuation movement.

Evacuation routes are not pre-authorized. Any route used during an evacuation is contingent on current conditions and confirmation through assessment processes.

6.1 Route Hierarchy

Evacuation routes within the Pemberton Valley are organized into a hierarchy to support clear, consistent decision-making during evacuation operations.

- **Primary Route:** Highway 99 (Sea to Sky Highway)
- **Secondary Route:** Highway 99 (Duffey Lake Road)

The primary route should be used whenever feasible. Secondary routes are contingency options and are authorized only when risks associated with their use are lower than remaining on or delaying evacuation via the primary route.

Note: The Hurley Forest Service Road ("The Hurley"), Anderson Lake Road/Highline Road ("The Highline"), and Lillooet Lake Road are not identified as a standard evacuation route due to variable conditions and is considered only under exceptional circumstances following assessment and authorization.

6.2 Primary Route: Highway 99 (Sea to Sky Highway)

Highway 99 (Sea to Sky Highway) is the default evacuation route for the Pemberton Valley and should be used unless explicitly restricted or closed. Planning details are outlined in Table 8.

Table 8: Primary Route Planning Details

Decision Role	Authorization Conditions	Operational Considerations
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Default evacuation route unless explicitly restricted 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Route assessment confirms: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Usability Acceptable safety conditions Manageable congestion risk 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Single south egress with no parallel alternate highway Limited passing opportunities; congestion may escalate quickly Flood-susceptible low points during freshet and extreme rainfall Sharp curves and grade changes require reduced speeds Seasonal traffic surges increase evacuation clearance time Access disruptions may isolate communities around Pemberton
Decision Rule		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The primary route should be used whenever possible and when confirmed as viable through road assessments 		

6.3 Secondary Route: Highway 99 (Duffey Lake Road)

A secondary route provides a contingency evacuation option when the primary route is restricted, closed, or at high risk of failure. Secondary route planning details are outlined in Table 9.

Table 9: Secondary Route Planning Details

Decision Role	Authorization Conditions	Operational Considerations
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Contingency evacuation options 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Primary route is restricted, closed, or at high risk of failure Secondary route is assessed as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Usable Appropriate for expected vehicle types 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Single north egress with no parallel alternate highway Potential access restrictions due to seasonal conditions Access disruptions may isolate communities around Pemberton Sharp curves and grade changes require reduced speeds Limited passing opportunities; congestion may escalate quickly

- Hazard conditions affecting Hwy 99 may also affect the Duffey Lake corridor (e.g., severe weather events), limiting its availability as a contingency route
- Steep terrain and landslide-prone areas may increase travel risks during heavy rainfall, atmospheric river events, and other slope-instability conditions
- Limited cellular service along much of the route may affect communications, situational awareness, and incident reporting

Decision Rule

- Secondary routes are authorized only when assessed as viable and when the risks associated with using the route are lower than the risks of remaining in place or delaying evacuation

6.4 Relationship with Evacuation Triggers

Route selection requirements become more stringent as evacuation trigger levels escalate.

- At **Level 1 (Monitoring)**, route planning and preliminary assessment may be initiated;
- At **Level 2 (Evacuation Alert)**, road assessments should be conducted to confirm route viability prior to evacuation movement; and
- At **Level 3 (Evacuation Order)**, only routes that have been explicitly assessed and authorized may be communicated and used for evacuation.

Route authorization status must be continuously reassessed throughout evacuation operations and updated as conditions evolve.

6.5 Transition to Road Assessment

The selection and authorization of evacuation routes are confirmed through the Road Assessment Process (Section 7). Road assessment findings directly inform:

- Route authorization status (open, restricted, closed);
- Vehicle suitability;
- Traffic management requirements; and
- Public evacuation messaging.

7. ROAD ASSESSMENT PROCESS

The road assessment process confirms whether evacuation routes are safe, passable, and appropriate for use during an evacuation. Given the reliance on Highway 99 as an evacuation corridor, timely and accurate road assessment is a critical prerequisite for authorizing vehicle-based evacuation where time allows.

Road assessment directly supports:

- Evacuation trigger escalation;
- Route authorization decisions; and
- Public evacuation messaging.

7.1 Requirement for Road Assessment

Road assessment is initiated when any of the following occur:

- An evacuation is being considered or escalated (i.e., Trigger Level 2 or 3);
- A hazard is known or suspected of impacting evacuation routes; or
- A secondary route may be required due to constraints on the primary route.

Road assessment may be bypassed only in rapid-onset, immediate life-safety scenarios where delaying movement would place lives at risk. In these cases, assessment should occur as soon as conditions permit.

7.2 Roles and Responsibilities

EOC:

- Determines need for route assessment;
- Establishes assessment priorities based on hazard conditions and evacuation timing; and
- Integrates assessment findings into evacuation decisions.

Assessment Personnel (MOTT and BC Hydro):

- Conduct physical inspection of designated evacuation routes;
- Prioritize known hazard locations and choke points;
- Report conditions using known reference points;
- Identify and document restrictions, hazards, or closures; and
- Conduct rapid damage assessments and provide field observations to support route viability decisions.

EOC Operations/Logistics:

- Receives and compiles assessment results from field personnel and partner agencies;
- Monitors available transportation and infrastructure information sources (e.g., DriveBC, MOTT updates, utility status reports);
- Confirms the authorization status of evacuation routes; and
- Coordinates traffic management measures and public communications.

7.3 Assessment Prioritization

Assessment teams prioritize the following conditions:

- **Travel Accessibility:** Route status (Open, Restricted, or Closed);
- **Safety:** Presence of debris, fire behaviour, smoke, flooding, or slope instability;
- **Vehicle Suitability:** Types of vehicles that can safely use the route (e.g., passenger vehicles vs. high-clearance or emergency vehicles only);
- **Hazard Proximity:** Nearby hazards, including fire edges, smoke impacts, flood-prone areas, or landslide/rockslide zones; and
- **Congestion Risk:** Narrow sections, bridges, intersections, and other pinch points.

7.4 Assessment Steps

Table 10 outlines the road assessment steps required to confirm route safety.

Table 10: Road Assessment Steps

Step	Description
Initiate Assessment	Identify routes requiring confirmation (primary and/or secondary)
Conduct Field Inspection	Prioritize known hazard areas and choke points
Report Findings	Use commonly known reference points, photos (if available), and clear non-technical descriptions
Evaluate Route Status	Open/Restricted/Closed
Confirm Authorization	EOC confirms which routes are authorized for evacuation
Communicate Decision	Update evacuation orders, traffic control, and public communications

7.5 Route Status Categories

Following assessment, evacuation routes are assigned one of the following statuses outlined in Table 11.

Table 11: Road Status Categories

Status	Description
Open	Passable for intended evacuation traffic
Restricted	Reduced speed, limited vehicle types, or traffic control required
Closed	Unsafe or impassable; evacuation not authorized via this route

Partial or intermittent access should be treated as Restricted or Closed, not Open.

7.6 Assessment Reference System

Highway 99 (Sea to Sky Highway) does not have consistently signed kilometre markers throughout the Pemberton Valley. As a result, road assessment findings and hazard locations must be communicated using clear, shared reference points that can be readily understood by decision-makers and field personnel.

Assessment teams should reference locations using one or more of the following:

- Named intersections (e.g., Highway 99 (Sea to Sky Highway) at Portage Road);
- Recognizable landmarks or features (e.g., bridge crossings, known slide areas);
- Directional descriptions (northbound/southbound lanes);
- Defined road segments between communities or junctions; and
- Where available, approximate distance from known reference points (e.g., approximately 5 km south of Pemberton).

Reports should prioritize clarity and consistency over precision. If exact locations cannot be confirmed, assessors should provide the best available description and update reports as conditions change.

7.7 Ongoing Reassessment and Updates

Route conditions on Highway 99 may change rapidly due to weather, fire behaviour, flooding, debris, or secondary hazards. During evacuation operations:

- Routes must be continuously reassessed at regular intervals or when conditions change;
- Authorization status (Open, Restricted, Closed) may be upgraded or downgraded as new information becomes available;
- Any change in route status must be communicated immediately to:
 - EOC Operations;
 - Traffic control personnel; and
 - Communications staff.

Where multiple reports are received for the same route segment, the EOC is responsible for reconciling information and confirming the current authorization status prior to updating public messaging.

8. TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AND EVACUATION EXECUTION

This section outlines how evacuation operations are executed in the field once evacuation zones, routes, and authorization decisions have been made. It establishes traffic management principles, transportation supports, and coordination requirements to ensure safe, efficient movement of people out of the Pemberton Valley.

Traffic management actions must remain aligned with authorized routes, current route status, and the evacuation trigger level.

8.1 Traffic Management Objectives

Traffic management during evacuation operations is intended to:

- Maintain functional evacuation routes and minimize bottlenecks;
- Support phased evacuation and zone sequencing;
- Ensure priority access for emergency responders and assessment teams; and
- Prevent re-entry into evacuated or hazardous areas.

8.2 Traffic Control and Route Management

8.2.1 Traffic Control Points

Traffic control points may be established to:

- Direct vehicles onto authorized evacuation routes;
- Restrict access to closed or unsafe routes;
- Prevent inbound traffic from entering evacuation corridors; and/or
- Support phased evacuation by controlling the timing and volume of vehicle movement.

Traffic control points should be adjusted dynamically as route conditions and evacuation priorities change.

8.2.2 Flow Management Considerations

Traffic flow management should account for the following:

- One-directional evacuation flow where feasible;
- Limited passing opportunities on Highway 99;
- Reduced speeds due to curves, grades, debris, smoke, or weather;
- Congestion caused by mixed vehicle types (e.g., recreational vehicles, trailers, commercial traffic); and
- The need to maintain responder access during evacuation movement.

Where congestion develops, traffic control measures should prioritize steady movement over speed.

8.3 Transportation Support and Assisted Evacuation

8.3.1 General Principles

While many residents have access to private vehicles, some individuals may be unable to self-evacuate due to mobility limitations, lack of vehicle access, or other constraints. Transportation support must be coordinated to prioritize life safety and maintain route functionality.

Evacuation planning must account for:

- Individuals without access to private vehicles;
- Individuals with mobility or functional needs;
- Children in care settings (e.g., daycare, school); and
- Seniors and those requiring assistance, individuals requiring support to evacuate with pets or service animals, and registered farm operators requiring early evacuation support for livestock, agricultural operations, or related resources.

Registered farms may be eligible for ESS during the Evacuation Alert stage and may undertake early evacuation actions to relocate livestock and other agricultural assets before conditions worsen.

8.3.2 Assisted Transportation

The EOC coordinates assisted evacuation transportation in collaboration with partners and service providers.

Operational considerations include:

- Activation of designated pick-up or muster points where feasible;
- Prioritization of transportation for vulnerable populations identified through ESS; and
- Use of available transportation resources based on route conditions and timing.

If time does not permit organized assisted evacuation, public messaging must provide clear instructions for where and how individuals can seek assistance.

8.4 Coordination and Communication During Evacuation

Effective evacuation execution requires continuous coordination between agencies responsible for emergency management, transportation infrastructure, route assessments, traffic management, and public communications, including:

- EOC Operations;
- Traffic control personnel and transportation agencies responsible for route management (i.e., RCMP, MOTT, and contracted roadway maintenance providers);
- Road assessment teams;
- Emergency responders; and
- Communications staff.

Key coordination principles:

- Any changes in route authorization must be communicated immediately;
- Public messaging must reflect current authorized routes only; and
- Field observations affecting safety or route conditions must be relayed back to the EOC promptly.

8.5 Re-Entry Control (During Evacuation Phase)

During active evacuation:

- Re-entry into evacuated zones should be restricted;
- Barricades or controls may be established to prevent unauthorized access; and
- Re-entry decisions are made separately and not assumed once evacuation is complete.

9. VULNERABLE POPULATIONS

This section identifies populations that may require additional support, prioritization, or modified evacuation approaches during an emergency. It ensures evacuation decisions and actions account for varying mobility, awareness, and support needs, while remaining flexible to real-time conditions.

Consideration of vulnerable populations directly informs:

- Evacuation prioritization and phasing;
- Assisted transportation planning;
- Public communication methods; and
- Coordination with health care providers regarding individuals requiring ongoing medical support in the community.

9.1 Identification of Vulnerable Populations

Vulnerable populations may include:

- Children in care (e.g., daycare, schools);
- Individuals with mobility, medical, or functional needs;
- Individuals without access to private vehicles;
- Visitors and tourists unfamiliar with the area;
- Individuals with limited access to emergency communications; and/or
- Unhoused, transient, or otherwise unsheltered individuals who may have limited access to emergency information, transportation, support services, or may require targeted outreach and evacuation assistance.

The presence and scale of vulnerable populations may vary based on:

- Time of day;
- Season (tourism and seasonal use); and
- Hazard type and warning time.

9.2 Child Care Facilities

Facilities providing care to children require priority consideration during evacuation due to supervision, reunification, and transportation requirements.

Operational considerations include:

- Child care facilities require early evacuation considerations;

- Upon issuance of an Evacuation Alert, parents or guardians are expected to collect children where feasible;
- If children cannot be collected in a timely manner, coordination is required to support assisted evacuation; and
- Evacuation of child care facilities should occur independently from zone sequencing (i.e., evacuation of child care facilities can occur before the zone it is located in has been evacuated).

9.3 Individuals with Mobility or Functional Needs

Some individuals may require additional time, assistance, or resources to evacuate safely.

Operational considerations include:

- Longer evacuation timelines;
- Potential need for assisted transportation or specialized vehicles; and
- Requirement for caregiver coordination.

Decision-makers should:

- Consider early evacuation for individuals requiring assistance;
- Coordinate transportation support through ESS; and
- Encourage community-based support where safe and appropriate.

9.4 Out-Patients and Community-Based Health Care Clients

Some individuals receiving health care services in the community may require additional support during evacuations due to medical, mobility, equipment, treatment, or care requirements. Information regarding these individuals may be confidential and is generally managed by the responsible health care provider. Coordination with British Columbia Emergency Health Services (BCEHS), and other health care providers is required to support evacuation planning and response activities.

Considerations include:

- Individuals reliant on home care or community health services;
- Individuals requiring medical equipment, medication, or ongoing treatment;
- Patients receiving care in non-institutional environments;
- Transportation requirements and continuity of care needs; and
- Coordination with BCEHS and health care providers while respecting privacy and confidentiality requirements.

9.5 Individuals Without Access to Private Vehicles

Some residents, visitors, and other transient populations may be unable to self-evacuate due to lack of transportation or unfamiliarity with available transportation options.

Operational considerations include:

- Activation of pick-up or muster points;
- Coordination of shared or assisted transport;
- Collaboration with community organizations to ensure messaging, and transportation options are communicated with unhoused and other transient populations; and
- Clear public messaging on how and where to request assistance.

9.6 Visitors and Tourists

Visitors may be present within official campsites or remote backcountry areas. Operational considerations include:

- Limited familiarity with evacuation routes and procedures;
- Potential lack of cellular coverage in some areas; and
- Increased reliance on in-person direction and visible signage.

Evacuation messaging for visitors should:

- Use clear, simple language;
- Avoid technical terminology; and
- Incorporate visual cues where possible.

Visitor evacuation may require more active direction than resident evacuation.

9.7 Communications and Support Considerations

When vulnerable populations are present:

- Do not rely solely on digital or automated alerting systems;
- Use multiple communication methods where possible;
- Engage partner organizations and community networks to assist with outreach; and
- Reinforce messaging through:
 - Door-to-door notification (when safe);
 - Verbal direction by responders; and
 - Visual cues and signage.

10. REUNIFICATION AND RECEPTION

This section outlines how evacuees are received, accounted for, and reunified following evacuation. It establishes clear roles, priorities, and coordination requirements to support orderly reception, reduce uncertainty for evacuees, and enable effective coordination with ESS.

The VOP and SLRD each maintain their own ESS programs and are responsible for coordinating ESS within their respective jurisdictions. During larger-scale events affecting multiple jurisdictions, a coordinated or joint ESS response may be implemented to support evacuees and optimize available resources.

Reunification and reception activities are initiated once evacuation movement is underway and must remain aligned with current route authorization and operational conditions.

10.1 Primary Reunification and Reception Centre

The Pemberton and District Community Centre is the primary reunification and RC for evacuation events in the Pemberton Valley, where feasible. Depending on the nature, location, and scale of the event, reception services may also be delivered through a virtual RC model, allowing evacuees to register for ESS, receive information, and access support remotely.

Reception services may be provided through physical, virtual, or hybrid arrangements based on operational requirements and available resources.

The site may be used for:

- Initial reception of evacuees;
- Family and caregiver reunification;
- Registration and access to ESS;
- Information sharing and situation updates; and/or
- Coordination with ESS and partner agencies.

Activation of physical and/or virtual RC services is coordinated through the EOC in collaboration with ESS personnel.

10.2 Reception Operations

Reception operations outlined in Table 12 focus on stabilizing evacuees and supporting transition to ESS services.

Table 12: Reception Operations

Operational Focus	Operational Considerations
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensuring safe arrival and meeting immediate basic needs Supporting registration and accountability processes Facilitating reunification of families and caregivers Communication of next steps, including sheltering and re-entry information when available 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evacuees may arrive by multiple modes (e.g., vehicle, pedestrian, bicycles) Arrivals may be staggered, particularly during phased evacuations Staffing and supplies may need to scale based on incident duration and evacuee volume

10.3 Registration and Accountability

Where feasible, evacuees should be registered upon arrival to:

- Support family reunification;
- Assist with accountability and situational awareness; and
- Enable coordination with ESS.

Registration processes are led by ESS in accordance with established procedures and may include a collection of:

- Name and household information;
- Contact details;
- Immediate needs or assistance requirements; and
- Destination or sheltering intentions.

If formal registration is delayed or unavailable:

- Priority is placed on life safety and reunification; and
- Accountability processes may be completed once conditions stabilize.

10.4 Reunification Considerations

Reunification efforts prioritize vulnerable populations and those separated during evacuation. Reunification considerations are outlined in Table 13.

Table 13: Reunification Considerations

Priority Groups	Reunification Decisions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Children in care (e.g., daycare evacuees) Individuals requiring caregivers Families separated during evacuation movement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prioritize safety and clarity over speed Decisions are based on confirmed information only

	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Actively address rumours or unverified reports
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10.5 Alternate Reception Locations

If the primary RC is unavailable or unsuitable due to hazard impacts or capacity limitations:

- Alternate reception or group lodging locations may be activated; or
- Coordination with ESS may direct evacuees to other facilities.

Decisions regarding alternate locations are made through the EOC based on:

- Route availability;
- Hazard impacts; and/or
- Capacity and accessibility.

10.6 Communication at Reception Sites

Clear consistent communication at reception and reunification sites is essential.

Information shared with evacuees should include:

- Current evacuation status;
- Authorized routes and restrictions;
- Expected timelines and next steps; and
- Re-entry information when available.

Only confirmed information should be communicated to evacuees.

11. COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY

This section establishes how evacuation information is communicated clearly, consistently, and redundantly before and during evacuation events. Effective communication supports timely public action, reduces confusion, and ensures evacuation movement aligns with authorized routes and operational decisions.

All evacuation messaging must remain aligned with current evacuation trigger levels, authorized routes, and EOC decisions.

11.1 Communication Objectives

During evacuation operations, communications are intended to:

- Prompt timely and appropriate action by affected populations;
- Clearly distinguish between Evacuation Alerts and Evacuation Orders;
- Provide route-specific instructions based on authorized evacuation routes;
- Reduce confusion, rumours, and conflicting information;
- Support coordination between EOC, field personnel, and partner agencies; and
- Support timely information sharing and coordination with affected FNs, partner agencies, and other partners through evacuation planning and operations.

11.2 Emergency Notification Methods

No single communication method is fully reliable during emergencies. Multiple methods may be used concurrently to maximize reach.

11.2.1 Primary Notification Methods

Evacuation information may be disseminated using the following:

- **Mobile/Cellphone Alerting:** Evacuation information, including Alerts and Orders, may be issued through Pemberton Alerts and SLRD's Voyent Alert!, as well as through the Province's Alert Ready system delivering notifications to compatible mobile devices, radio, and television;
- **Direct Notification (Door-to-Door):** Conducted by emergency responders (e.g., fire, police, or designated community personnel) where time and conditions permit; and
- **Radio Communications:** Local radio channels may be used to communicate evacuation instructions and updates.

11.2.2 Supplementary Notification Methods

Additional communication methods may include:

- **Community Networks:** Information sharing through leadership, community coordinators, local organizations and associations, and informal networks (e.g., family, neighbours);
- **Social Media and Digital Platforms:** Updates may be posted through official community or agency channels where connectivity allows; and/or
- **Pre-Established Contact Lists:** Phone trees, email lists, or other distribution lists.

Evacuation signage may provide visual direction but does not replace official alerts or orders.

11.3 Authority and Message Control

Evacuation alerts and orders are approved by the Incident Commander (IC) in coordination with the EOC, in accordance with local authority procedures.

To maintain consistency and safety:

- Evacuation messaging is coordinated through the EOC;
- Only authorized routes are communicated publicly;
- Routes under assessment or restriction are not communicated as evacuation options; and
- Messaging is updated immediately if route authorization changes.

11.4 Alert and Order Messaging

The applicability of Evacuation Alert and Evacuation Order messaging and content is outlined in Table 14.

Where an evacuation may affect FN communities, traditional territories, or areas of interest, information sharing should occur as early as practicable and continue throughout the incident. Notification and communication activities should support situational awareness, operational coordination, and relationship-based engagement alongside public-facing evacuation messaging.

Table 14: Alert and Order Messaging

Evacuation Alert
Used when conditions indicate a potential need to evacuate.
Alert messaging should include:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hazard type and affected areas/zones; • Instructions to prepare for evacuation; • Information regarding available sources of official updates and situational information; • Direction to monitor official updates; and • Specific actions for vulnerable populations (if applicable).
Evacuation Order
Used when there is an immediate threat to life safety. Evacuation Orders must be concise and action oriented.
Order messaging must include:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clear direction to evacuate immediately; • Identified evacuation areas/zones; and • Prohibited actions (e.g., do not tow recreational trailers or boats during an Evacuation Order).

11.5 Route-Specific Communications

Public messaging must reflect current route authorization as confirmed through the Road Assessment Process (Section 7).

Key principles include:

- Communicate authorized routes and affected evacuation zones only;
- Avoid referencing routes under assessment or restriction;
- Avoid speculation or conditional language regarding route safety; and
- Update messaging immediately if route status changes.

Messaging should never imply a route is safe unless it has been explicitly authorized.

11.6 Limitations and Redundancy

Communication systems may be degraded due to:

- Power outages;
- Cellular coverage gaps;
- Network congestion; or

- Infrastructure damage.

As a result:

- Redundant communication methods should be used wherever possible; and
- Messaging should assume partial reach and reinforce key instructions repeatedly.

12. TRAINING, EXERCISES, AND MAINTENANCE

This section ensures the Evacuation Route Plan remains usable, current, and familiar to those responsible for implementing it. Regular training, exercises, and maintenance are essential to ensure evacuation decisions can be made and executed under real-world conditions.

Training and exercises should emphasize decision-making, coordination, and route authorization.

12.1 Training

Training activities should focus on practical application and the ability to navigate key decision points under time pressure.

Training objectives include:

- Familiarity with evacuation trigger levels and escalation;
- Understanding the relationship between triggers, route selection, and road assessment;
- Understanding evacuation zones and their role in phased evacuation;
- Use of evacuation zone maps and access reference materials; and
- Understanding traffic management and assisted evacuation coordination.

Training may include:

- EOC briefings and orientations;
- Tabletop discussions focused on decision flow; and
- Orientation for new personnel or partner agencies.

12.2 Exercises

Exercises are used to validate evacuation decision-making, coordination, and information flow across agencies.

Exercise objectives include:

- Practicing evacuation trigger escalation and decision timing;
- Testing route assessment, authorization, and reassessment processes;
- Evaluating zone activation and phased evacuation decisions;
- Practicing communication of Evacuation Alerts and Orders; and
- Identifying gaps, assumptions, or constraints affecting evacuation execution.

Exercises may be:

- Discussion-based, such as a tabletop exercise; or
- Scenario-based drills using realistic hazards relevant to the Pemberton Valley (e.g., wildfire, flooding, landslide).

Exercises should prioritize decision flow and coordination, not perfect outcomes.

12.3 Incorporation of Lessons Identified

Findings from exercises, real evacuation events, or near-miss incidents should be documented and reviewed to improve plan effectiveness.

Lessons identified should be used to:

- Update evacuation zones or prioritization logic;
- Refine trigger level thresholds or decision guidance;
- Improve route selection and assessment processes; and
- Clarify roles, coordination, or communication procedures.

12.4 Plan Review and Updates

The plan should be reviewed:

- At least annually; and
- Following any evacuation event, exercise, or significant incident.

Reviews should consider:

- Changes to road conditions, access, or infrastructure;
- Updates to hazard information or risk assessments;
- Changes in population patterns or vulnerable populations; and
- Lessons identified through training, exercises, or real events.

Minor updates (e.g., map revisions or contact changes) may be made without revising the full plan, provided the decision framework remains unchanged.

12.5 Roles and Responsibilities for Plan Maintenance

Responsibility for maintaining this Evacuation Route Plan includes:

- Coordinating reviews and updates;
- Ensuring maps and reference materials are available and up-to-date;

- Incorporating lessons identified into revisions; and
- Communicating changes to relevant staff and partner agencies.

Clear ownership of plan maintenance ensures accountability, continuity, and operational readiness.

12.6 Record of Revisions

Table 15 documents all approved revisions to the Evacuation Route Plan, including the date, summary of changes, and authorizing authority to ensure version control, accountability, and traceability of updates over time.

Table 15: Record of Revisions

Version Number	Date of Revision	Summary of Changes	Authorizing Authority

ANNEX A. EVACUATION ZONE MAPS AND PROFILES

This annex contains evacuation zone maps for the Pemberton Valley. A total of twelve evacuation zones are defined, encompassing areas within the VOP and the SLRD.

Each map in this annex:

- Depicts the geographic extent of a single evacuation zone;
- Identifies key access points and primary connections to evacuation routes;
- Supports public messaging and zone-based evacuation alerts and orders; and
- Is intended to support phased evacuation decision-making.

Evacuation zone maps are used to:

- Clearly identify areas subject to Evacuation Alerts or Evacuation Orders;
- Support prioritization and sequencing of evacuation actions; and
- Improve clarity and consistency in public and inter-agency communications.

These maps do not pre-authorize evacuation routes and do not replace operational route assessments. Route authorization and suitability are confirmed through the Route Selection Framework (Section 6) and Road Assessment Process (Section 7).

A.1 EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES

Each zone map is accompanied by an Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE) for the Primary Route (to Squamish) and Secondary Route (to Lillooet). These estimates are determined through a formula which leverages a Zone Assessment Matrix, mobilization time estimate, and drive time¹.

Each ETE is based on the following formula and is applied separately to each route:

$$\text{Mobilization Time} + \text{Drive Time} + \text{Zone Complexity Adjustment} = \text{Evacuation Time Estimate}$$

- **Mobilization Time:** The average time for individuals to begin evacuating once the order has been given (fixed baseline of 15 minutes);
- **Drive Time:** The average length of time (in minutes) to drive to Squamish (Primary Route) or Lillooet (Secondary Route); and
- **Zone Complexity Adjustment:** Additional time derived from the Zone Assessment Matrix (10 minutes per point) to account for evacuation complexity and social factors.
 - The Zone Assessment Matrix assigns a score to each of the following criteria:
 - Minimum number of other zones that need to be crossed to evacuate;

¹ Detailed criteria and results can be found within the supplemental Pemberton Valley Evacuation Time Calculations document.

- Zone size (km²);
- Population;
- Vulnerable populations (ages 0-14, 65+);
- Number of schools; and
- Volume of livestock.

It is important to note that ETEs contained within the zone maps do not account for the time it takes to execute an Evacuation Order. Execution of orders must be considered in conjunction with ETEs to sufficiently plan for the full length of time from execution to completion of evacuation.

A.2 MAP MAINTENANCE AND UPDATES

- Maps should be reviewed periodically and updated as access, infrastructure, or hazards change;
- Updated maps may be issued independently of this plan, provided evacuation zone logic and decision frameworks remain unchanged; and
- Changes to maps do not require revisions to the main body of this plan unless zone boundaries or route hierarchy are altered.

A.3 EVACUATION ZONE OVERVIEW

Note: Zones may be activated individually or in combination, depending on the hazard, evacuation trigger level, route viability, and operational conditions. Not all incidents will require activation of all zones. When specific incidents not requiring a full evacuation are conducted, hazard-specific evacuation area mapping must be provided.

The detailed zone profiles in Annex A.4 and Annex A.5 provide zone-specific information to support operational decision-making, including access considerations, key risk drivers, and primary evacuation actions.

An overview of all evacuation zones is provided in Figure 3.




Figure 3: Evacuation Zone Overview

A.4 VOP EVACUATION ZONE MAPS

A.4.1 Zone VOP 1: Downtown West

Zone VOP 1 (Downtown West), outlined in Figure 4 and Table 16, includes the western portion of the VOP, characterized by residential neighbourhoods, municipal facilities, schools, child care facilities, and essential services. The zone has high daytime population fluctuation and contains several vulnerable population facilities.

- Zone VOP 1 should be considered early for evacuation alerting where hazards threaten Highway 99 access or local circulation;
- Traffic management is critical to prevent spillback into adjacent zones (VOP 2 and VOP 3);
- Door-to-door notification may be required for vulnerable facilities (i.e., schools, child care facilities, long-term care) if automated alerting is insufficient; and
- Evacuation actions should be coordinated closely with assisted evacuation procedures.

Table 16: Zone VOP 1 - Downtown West Profile

Primary Access	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highway 99 (Sea to Sky Highway) via Portage Road and local collectors 	
Decision Role of this Zone	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High-priority urban evacuation zone due to population density, presence of vulnerable populations, and proximity to Highway 99 	
Key Risk Drivers	Primary Evacuation Actions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High population density and daytime population surge • Presence of schools, child care facilities, and municipal facilities • Reliance on Highway 99 for evacuation • Potential congestion at Portage Road/Highway 99 intersection 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Early consideration for Evacuation Alert during escalating hazards • Phased evacuation coordinated to manage congestion • Prioritize evacuation of child care and school facilities • Direct traffic toward authorized Highway 99 access points only
Operational Notes	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Population: 925 • Multiple vulnerable facilities (schools, child care) • Limited local road redundancy; congestion likely • Strong coordinated required with traffic control and communications 	
Evacuation Time Estimate	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Primary Route: 144 minutes 	

- **Secondary Route:** 157 minutes




Figure 4: Zone VOP 1 - Downtown West Map

A.4.2 Zone VOP 2: Downtown East

Zone VOP 2 (Downtown East), outlined in Figure 5 and Table 17, includes the eastern portion of the VOP and contains the highest concentration of residential population and mixed-use development in the community. The zone includes multi-unit housing, schools, child care facilities, and commercial services, resulting in high evacuation demand and elevated congestion during emergency events.

- Zone VOP 2 is likely to drive overall evacuation clearance time for the VOP due to its population size;
- Phasing should be coordinated with adjacent zones (VOP 1 and VOP 3) to avoid simultaneous release onto Highway 99;
- Traffic control at Portage Road and nearby collectors is critical to prevent gridlock; and
- Assisted evacuation planning should be initiated early for this zone as trigger levels escalate.

Table 17: Zone VOP 2 - Downtown East Profile

Primary Access	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highway 99 (Sea to Sky Highway) via Portage Road and local collectors 	
Decision Role of this Zone	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High-priority evacuation zone due to population density, concentration of vulnerable populations, and limited road redundancy 	
Key Risk Drivers	Primary Evacuation Actions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highest population density in the VOP • Presence of schools, child care facilities, and multi-unit housing, • Heavy reliance on Portage Road/Highway 99 access • High congestion during peak hours 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Early evacuation alerting during escalating hazards • Phased evacuation to manage traffic volumes • Prioritize evacuation of child care facilities, schools, and assisted-living populations • Direct all evacuation traffic to authorized Highway 99 access points only
Operational Notes	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Population: 2,143 • Limited internal circulation; spillback likely if unmanaged • Requires traffic control and coordinated messaging • Door-to-door notification may be required for vulnerable facilities 	
Evacuation Time Estimate	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Primary Route: 153 minutes • Secondary Route: 166 minutes 	




Figure 5: Zone VOP 2 - Downtown East Map

A.4.3 Zone VOP 3: The Ridge & Industrial Complex

Zone VOP 3 (The Ridge & Industrial Complex), outlined in Figure 6 and Table 18, includes the industrial area, airport adjacent areas, and lower-density residential development south and east of the downtown core. The zone contains industrial operations, light commercial uses, and scattered residential areas, resulting in mixed evacuation demand and potential conflicts between evacuation traffic and industrial vehicle movements.

- Zone VOP 3 may be evacuated concurrently or sequentially with downtown zones depending on hazard location and route conditions;
- Industrial operators should be notified early to support traffic reduction and safe shutdown where feasible;
- Traffic management measures should prioritize resident evacuation over industrial movements; and
- Coordination with adjacent SLRD zones is required to avoid route congestion south of VOP.

Table 18: Zone VOP 3 - The Ridge & Industrial Complex Profile

Primary Access	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highway 99 (Sea to Sky Highway) via Portage Road, Airport Road, and Industrial Way 	
Decision Role of this Zone	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Moderate-priority evacuation zone due to mixed land use, lower residential density, and potential interaction with industrial traffic 	
Key Risk Drivers	Primary Evacuation Actions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Industrial and commercial vehicle movements • Proximity to Highway 99 and airport land • Limited internal road redundancy • Potential hazardous materials presence associated with industrial uses 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordinate evacuation timing to avoid peak industrial traffic • Phase evacuation with adjacent zones (VOP 2 and SLRD areas) • Direct traffic toward authorized Highway 99 access points only • Restrict heavy or non-essential industrial traffic during evacuation
Operational Notes	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Population: 342 • Industrial traffic may affect evacuation flow • Requires coordination with businesses and MOTT • Traffic control likely required at Portage Road, Airport Road, and Industrial Way 	
Evacuation Time Estimate	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Primary Route: 147 minutes 	

- **Secondary Route:** 152 minutes




Figure 6: Zone VOP 3 - The Ridge & Industrial Complex Map

A.4.4 Zone VOP 4: Airport & Golf Courses

Zone VOP 4 (Airport & Golf Courses), outlined in Figure 7 and Table 19, includes the Pemberton Regional Airport, Big Sky Golf Club, Sunstone Golf Club, and surrounding open or agricultural areas south of the downtown core. The zone has a very small permanent residential population but may experience fluctuating daytime occupancy related to airport operations, recreation, and seasonal activity.

- Zone VOP 4 is typically addressed after higher-density VOP zones unless directly threatened by the hazard;
- Coordination with airport management is required to manage aircraft, fuel, and on-site personnel during evacuation;
- Due to low residential demand, evacuation actions are primarily site-specific rather than population-driven; and
- Access and egress must be managed to avoid conflict with adjacent zones (VOP 3 and SLRD areas).

Table 19: Zone VOP 4 - Airport and Golf Courses Profile

Primary Access	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Airport Road, Portage Road, and connections to Highway 99 	
Decision Role of this Zone	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Low-priority residential evacuation zone; special-use area requiring coordination with airport and site operations 	
Key Risk Drivers	Primary Evacuation Actions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presence of airport infrastructure and aircraft operations • Seasonal or transient occupancy (staff, visitors) • Limited access routes connecting to Highway 99 • Proximity to agricultural and industrial lands 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordinate evacuation actions with airport and facility operators • Confirm cessation of control of aircraft movements if required • Direct all evacuation traffic to authorized Highway 99 access points only
Operational Notes	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Population: 5 • Evacuation demand driven more by use than residency • May require site-specific notifications rather than zone-wide alerts • Potential use of open areas for staging or response if conditions allow 	
Evacuation Time Estimate	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Primary Route: 144 minutes 	

- **Secondary Route:** 151 minutes



A.5 SLRD AREA C EVACUATION ZONE MAPS

A.5.1 Zone SLRD 1: Pemberton Meadows

Zone SLRD 1 (Pemberton Meadows), outlined in Figure 8 and Table 20, encompasses the rural and agricultural lands west of the VOP. The area includes farms, livestock operations, scattered rural residences, and seasonal agricultural activity. The zone has limited access routes and is susceptible to flooding and isolation, particularly during freshet events.

- Zone SLRD 1 should be considered for early evacuation when hazards threaten road access, particularly during flood events;
- Livestock evacuation should be initiated earlier than residential evacuation where sufficient warning time exists;
- Assisted evacuation support may be required for residents without access to private vehicles or trailers; and
- If access routes become compromised, the zone may become isolated, requiring alternate response or shelter-in-place considerations.

Table 20: Zone SLRD 1 - Pemberton Meadows Profile

Primary Access	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pemberton Meadows Road • Secondary Access: Ryan River Forest Service Road (limited, seasonal suitability) 	
Decision Role of this Zone	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High-priority evacuation zone due to flood risk, limited access, and potential for early isolation 	
Key Risk Drivers	Primary Evacuation Actions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Floodplain exposure and overtopping risk during freshet • Limited road access with no parallel alternate routes • Agricultural and livestock operations requiring extended evacuation time • Potential for rapid isolation if Pemberton Meadows Rd is compromised 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Early evacuation alerting for slow-onset hazards (e.g., flooding) • Prioritize evacuation ahead of projected road inundation or isolation • Encourage early livestock evacuation where warning time allows • Direct evacuation traffic via authorized routes only

Operational Notes

- **Population: 850**
- Significant livestock and agricultural activity
- Evacuation timing is critical to avoid road loss
- Route assessment should prioritize Pemberton Meadows Rd

Evacuation Time Estimate

- **Primary Route:** 169 minutes
- **Secondary Route:** 181 minutes




Figure 8: Zone SLRD 1 - Pemberton Meadows Map

A.5.2 Zone SLRD 2: Pemberton Central

Zone SLRD 2 (Pemberton Central), outlined in Figure 9 and Table 21, includes the small, semi-rural residential area immediately adjacent to the VOP. The zone functions as an interface area between rural SLRD lands and the urban VOP core, with residents often relying on VOP roads and services for access and evacuation.

- Zone SLRD 2 evacuation should be sequenced with nearby VOP zones to avoid simultaneous release onto Highway 99;
- Traffic management measures within the VOP may directly affect evacuation feasibility for this zone;
- Messaging should clearly identify authorized access routes through the VOP to prevent self-directed routing; and
- In most scenarios, evacuation actions for Zone SLRD 2 can be implemented concurrently with later-phase VOP evacuations, unless directly threatened.

Table 21: Zone SLRD 2 - Pemberton Central Profile

Primary Access	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local collector roads connecting to the VOP road network and Highway 99 	
Decision Role of this Zone	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Moderate-priority evacuation zone. Interface area should be coordinated closely with VOP zones 	
Key Risk Drivers	Primary Evacuation Actions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reliance on VOP road network for evacuation • Limited internal road redundancy • Proximity to VOP evacuation routes and traffic control points • Potential congestion spillover from VOP zones 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordinate evacuation timing with adjacent VOP zones • Use phased evacuation to prevent congestion at VOP access points • Direct traffic through authorized routes only
Operational Notes	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Population: 140 • Evacuation clearance highly dependent on VOP traffic conditions • Require close coordination between SLRD and VOP EOC functions • Limited need for assisted evacuation but should be confirmed early 	
Evacuation Time Estimate	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Primary Route: 142 minutes • Secondary Route: 151 minutes 	




Figure 9: Zone SLRD 2 - Pemberton Central Map

A.5.3 Zone SLRD 3: Pemberton Fringe South

Zone SLRD 3 (Pemberton Fringe South), outlined in Figure 10 and Table 22, includes a small, semi-rural residential area located south of the VOP, adjacent to the airport and industrial areas. The zone has a very small permanent population, but evacuation feasibility is closely tied to VOP and Highway 99 traffic conditions.

- Zone SLRD 3 evacuation should generally occur in coordination with nearby VOP zones, unless directly threatened;
- Due to its small population, evacuation actions are primarily route-and-timing-dependent, not demand-driven;
- Messaging should clearly identify authorized evacuation routes to prevent self-directed routing; and
- Traffic management decisions within VOP or on Highway 99 may directly affect evacuation feasibility for this zone.

Table 22: Zone SLRD 3 - Pemberton Fringe South Profile

Primary Access	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Airport Road and Portage Road via Highway 99 	
Decision Role of this Zone	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Low-priority residential evacuation zone. Evacuation actions should be coordinated with adjacent VOP and SLRD areas 	
Key Risk Drivers	Primary Evacuation Actions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reliance on Highway 99 and VOP access routes • Limited internal road redundancy • Proximity to industrial and airport • Potential congestion spillback from VOP evacuation operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordinate evacuation timing with adjacent zones (VOP 3 and VOP 4) • Direct evacuation traffic to authorized Highway 99 access points only • Avoid independent or early release that could conflict with VOP traffic management
Operational Notes	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Population: 22 • Evacuation clearance highly dependent on Highway 99 conditions • Minimal assisted evacuation demand anticipated but should be confirmed • Requires coordination between SLRD and VOP EOC functions 	
Evacuation Time Estimate	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Primary Route: 139 minutes • Secondary Route: 148 minutes 	




Figure 10: Zone SLRD 3 - Pemberton Fringe South Map

A.5.4 Zone SLRD 4: Mount Currie

Zone SLRD 4 (Mount Currie), outlined in Figure 11 and Table 23, includes the surrounding residential communities and lands in the area. The zone includes higher-density residential areas, community facilities, and surrounding lands with shared access routes.

- Evacuation actions for Zone SLRD 4 should be coordinated closely with VOP and neighbouring SLRD zones to avoid congestion and conflicting movements;
- Phased evacuation is recommended where hazards allow, particularly during peak travel periods;
- Messaging should clearly identify authorized evacuation routes and discourage self-directed routing; and
- Engagement with local leadership and community networks may support more effective notification and compliance.

Table 23: Zone SLRD 4 - Mount Currie Profile

Primary Access	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highway 99 via Portage Road, Main Street, and local connectors 	
Decision Role of this Zone	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High-priority zone due to population concentration, shared access constraints, and evacuation complexity 	
Key Risk Drivers	Primary Evacuation Actions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Concentrated residential population • Reliance on Highway 99 and VOP access routes • Limited internal road redundancy • Potential congestion at shared junctions with VOP and adjacent SLRD zones 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordinate evacuation timing and adjacent SLRD and VOP zones • Use phased evacuation to manage access to Highway 99 • Direct evacuation traffic to authorized routes only • Provide clear, zone-specific public messaging
Operational Notes	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Population: 95 • Evacuation clearance dependent on Highway 99 conditions • Traffic control may be required at key intersections • Assisted evacuation needs should be confirmed early 	
Evacuation Time Estimate	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Primary Route: 145 minutes • Secondary Route: 141 minutes 	




Figure 11: Zone SLRD 4 - Mount Currie Map

A.5.5 Zone SLRD 5: Owl Creek

Zone SLRD 5 (Owl Creek), outlined in Figure 12 and Table 24, encompasses a large, semi-rural area north of the VOP, including dispersed residential development and connecting roads between Mount Currie communities and the VOP. The zone has a moderate population spread over a larger area, resulting in longer evacuation timelines and strong dependence on shared access routes.

- Evacuation for Zone SLRD 5 should be sequenced carefully to avoid congestion on Highway 99, particularly where it intersects with VOP and Mount Currie traffic;
- Due to dispersed development, early alerting may be beneficial to allow residents additional time to mobilize;
- Messaging should emphasize authorized evacuation routes and discourage self-directed shortcuts through neighbouring zones; and
- Coordination between SLRD and VOP EOC functions is required to manage shared access points.

Table 24: Zone SLRD 5 - SLRD Owl Creek Profile

Primary Access	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highway 99 via Portage Road, Main Street, and connecting local roads 	
Decision Role of this Zone	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Moderate-priority evacuation zone due to dispersed population and reliance on shared evacuation corridors 	
Key Risk Drivers	Primary Evacuation Actions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dispersed residential population over a large geographic area • Heavy reliance on Highway 99 for evacuation • Limited redundancy • Potential congestion at shared junctions with VOP and Mount Currie zones 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordinate evacuation timing with adjacent SLRD and VOP zones • Use phased evacuation to manage access to Highway 99 • Direct evacuation traffic to authorized routes only
Operational Notes	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Population: 256 • Evacuation clearance time influenced by travel distance to Highway 99 • Traffic control may be required at key connectors and junctions • Assisted evacuation needs should be confirmed early due to dispersed households 	
Evacuation Time Estimate	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Primary Route: 152 minutes • Secondary Route: 145 minutes 	




Figure 12: Zone SLRD 5 - SLRD Owl Creek Profile

A.5.6 Zone SLRD 6: Wedgewoods Subdivision

Zone SLRD 6 (Wedgewoods Subdivision), outlined in Figure 13 and Table 25, includes a small, clustered residential subdivision located along Highway 99 south of Pemberton, immediately north of the Whistler municipal boundary. The zone has a very small permanent population but is operationally significant due to its direct reliance on Highway 99, limited internal road redundancy, and proximity to regional traffic flows toward Whistler.

- Despite a small population, Zone SLRD 6 should be monitored closely due to its single-corridor dependency;
- Evacuation actions may need to be initiated early relative to population size if Highway 99 viability deteriorates;
- Coordination with Whistler and provincial partners may be required where evacuation timing overlaps with regional traffic management; and
- If Highway 99 becomes impassable, the zone may become isolated, requiring contingency planning or shelter-in-place considerations.

Table 25: Zone SLRD 6 - Wedgewoods Subdivision Profile

Primary Access	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highway 99 	
Decision Role of this Zone	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Low-population but route-sensitive evacuation zone; actions driven primarily by Highway 99 conditions 	
Key Risk Drivers	Primary Evacuation Actions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Single primary access via Highway 99 • No meaningful internal route redundancy • Exposure to highway closures, debris, wildfire, or winter weather impacts • Potential congestion or access restrictions due to Whistler-bound traffic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordinate evacuation timing with Highway 99 status and regional traffic management • Activate early if Highway 99 access is threatened or constrained • Direct evacuation exclusively via authorized Highway 99 routing
Operational Notes	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Population: 11 • Small population • Evacuation feasibility dependent on real-time highway conditions • Minimal assisted evacuation demand anticipated, but isolation risk is high if access is lost 	
Evacuation Time Estimate	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Primary Route: 130 minutes • Secondary Route: 198 minutes 	



A.5.7 Zone SLRD 7: Birken

Zone SLRD 7 (Birken), outlined in Figure 14 and Table 26, includes the community of Birken and surrounding areas located north of the VOP along Highway 99. The zone consists of a linear settlement pattern with dispersed residential development, community facilities, and limited internal road redundancy. Evacuation feasibility is influenced by Highway 99 access and continuity, with a heightened risk of isolation if the corridor is disrupted.

- Due to its linear, highway-dependent layout, evacuation decisions for Birken should prioritize route protection and early action over population volume alone;
- Delayed evacuation may result in complete isolation if Highway 99 becomes impassable;
- Phased evacuation may be required to coordinate movement with upstream and downstream zones; and
- Coordination with provincial partners may be required if Highway 99 conditions deteriorate regionally.

Table 26: Zone SLRD 7 - Birken Profile

Primary Access	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highway 99 	
Decision Role of this Zone	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Moderate-to-high-priority evacuation zone due to population size, linear development, and single-corridor dependency 	
Key Risk Drivers	Primary Evacuation Actions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Near-total reliance on Highway 99 for evacuation • Linear development with minimal internal redundancy • Exposure to landslide, wildfire, flooding, or winter weather impacts affecting the corridor • Potential for rapid isolation if access is lost 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitor Highway 99 conditions closely and consider early evacuation where access is threatened • Coordinate evacuation timing with adjacent SLRD and VOP zones • Direct all evacuation traffic via authorized Highway 99 routing only
Operational Notes	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Population: 475 • Population larger than fringe SLRD zones, smaller than Mt. Currie • Assisted evacuation needs may be present due to rural context • Traffic control may be required at key access points along the corridor 	
Evacuation Time Estimate	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Primary Route: 204 minutes 	

- **Secondary Route:** 189 minutes




Figure 14: Zone SLRD 7 - Birken Map

A.5.8 Zone SLRD 8: Lillooet Lake Estates

Zone SLRD 8 (Lillooet Lake Estates), outlined in Figure 15 and Table 27, includes a small, lakeside residential community located along Lillooet Lake, south of the VOP. The zone is characterized by limited access, dispersed residential development, and high isolation risk. Evacuation feasibility is strongly constrained by a single access road, steep terrain, and known geotechnical hazards in the area.

- Early activation is critical for this zone when warning time allows; delayed action significantly increases isolation risk;
- Evacuation decisions should be driven by route condition and hazard proximity, not population size;
- Phased evacuation is generally not applicable due to single-access configuration; and
- Contingency planning should consider scenarios where road access is lost and evacuation cannot proceed.

Table 27: Zone SLRD 8 - Lillooet Lake Estates Profile

Primary Access	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highway 99 	
Decision Role of this Zone	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High-priority evacuation zone due to severe access constraints and isolation risk 	
Key Risk Drivers	Primary Evacuation Actions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Single access route vulnerable to blockage • Steep terrain and known debris-flow hazards (e.g., Catiline Creek area) • Lakeside location with limited internal road redundancy • Potential for rapid isolation during wildfire, landslide, or flooding events 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consider early evacuation where hazards threaten access routes • Prioritize route assessment and monitoring of access and road conditions • Coordinate evacuation timing closely with route viability • Direct evacuation via authorized routes only
Operational Notes	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Population: 151 • Small population but high evacuation complexity • Assisted evacuation may be required for some residents • If access is lost, evacuation may become difficult, requiring shelter-in-place or alternate response measures 	
Evacuation Time Estimate	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Primary Route: 175 minutes • Secondary Route: 137 minutes 	




Figure 15: Zone SLRD 8 - Lillooet Lake Estates Map

ANNEX B. ROAD ASSESSMENT TOOLS

B.1 ROAD ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST

Table 28 provides a consistent, efficient method for field use to confirm route viability prior to authorizing evacuation traffic.

Table 28: Road Assessment Checklist

Item	Information to Record	
Date		
Time (start)		
Time (completed)		
Assessor Name/Role		
Route Assessed	☐ Highway 99 (Sea to Sky Highway) ☐ Highway 99 (Duffey Lake Road) ☐ Other (specify)	
Direction of Travel	☐ North ☐ South	
Observed Conditions (check all that apply)		
Condition	Yes/No	Notes
Rockslide/debris	☐ Yes ☐ No	
Flooding/standing water	☐ Yes ☐ No	
Road washout	☐ Yes ☐ No	
Fire activity near route	☐ Yes ☐ No	
Smoke reducing visibility	☐ Yes ☐ No	
Fallen trees/debris	☐ Yes ☐ No	
Structural issue (bridge/culvert)	☐ Yes ☐ No	
Industrial traffic interference	☐ Yes ☐ No	

Route Suitability	
Assessment	Selection
Travel Accessibility	☐ Open ☐ Restricted ☐ Closed
Vehicle Suitability	☐ All vehicles ☐ High-clearance only ☐ Emergency only
Speed impacts expected	☐ Yes ☐ No
Traffic control required	☐ Yes ☐ No
Supporting Information	
Item	Yes/No
Photos taken	☐ Yes ☐ No
Re-assessment required	☐ Yes ☐ No
Recommended re-assessment timeframe	___ hours

B.2 ROAD ASSSSMENT FORM

Table 29 provides how assessment findings are reported to decision-makers.

Table 29: Road Assessment Form

Field	Entry
Date/Time Reported	
Assessor Name	
Route Name	
Current Route Status	☐ Open ☐ Restricted ☐ Closed
Primary Issue Identified	
Secondary Issues (if any)	
Vehicle Restrictions	☐ None ☐ High-clearance ☐ Emergency only
Traffic Control Required	☐ Yes ☐ No
Estimated Time Valid	☐ <1 hr ☐ 1-2 hrs ☐ >2 hrs

Recommendation to EOC	☐ Authorize ☐ Restrict ☐ Close
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B.3 ROUTE STATUS SUMMARY SHEET

Table 30 supports the maintenance of a real-time snapshot of route availability during evacuation operations.

Table 30: Route Status Summary

Route	Status	Restrictions	Last Assessed (Time)	Next Check Due
Highway 99 (Sea to Sky Highway)	☐ Open ☐ Restricted ☐ Closed			
Highway 99 (Duffey Lake Road)	☐ Open ☐ Restricted ☐ Closed			
Other	☐ Open ☐ Restricted ☐ Closed			

ANNEX C. DECISION AIDS

C.1 ZONE ACTIVATION QUICK REFERENCE

Table 31 translates conditions into expected actions.

Table 31: Zone Activation Reference

Trigger Level	Indicators	Expected Actions
Level 1 – Monitoring	Hazard identified, no immediate threat	Monitor, coordinate internally, plan road assessment
Level 2 – Evacuation Alert	Conditions worsening, time limited	Issue Alert, initiate road assessment, prep vulnerable populations
Level 3 – Evacuation Order	Immediate threat to life safety	Issue Order, activate routes, deploy traffic control

C.2 ROUTE SELECTION QUICK REFERENCE

Table 32 prevents default or unsafe route use.

Table 32: Route Selection Reference

Route Type	When Used	Key Constraints
Primary – Highway 99 (Sea to Sky)	Default route	Must be assessed and passable
Secondary Route – Highway 99 (Duffey Lake Road)	Primary restricted or closed	Variable conditions, suitability

Note: The Hurley Forest Service Road ("The Hurley"), Anderson Lake Road/Highline Road ("The Highline"), and Lillooet Lake Road are not identified as a standard evacuation route due to variable conditions and is considered only under exceptional circumstances following assessment and authorization.

C.3 DECISION CONFIRMATION CHECKLIST

Table 33 ensures key checks are not missed.

Table 33: Decision Confirmation Checklist

Check	Yes/No
Hazard confirmed or escalating	☐ Yes ☐ No
Zones identified and prioritized	☐ Yes ☐ No
Route assessment completed (if feasible)	☐ Yes ☐ No
Communications ready	☐ Yes ☐ No

ANNEX D. COMMUNICATIONS TEMPLATES

This annex ensures evacuation messaging is clear, consistent, and actionable during emergencies, including when communications capacity is limited.

D.1 EVACUATION ALERT MESSAGE TEMPLATE

Use when: Trigger Level 2 – Evacuation Alert (prepare to evacuate, not immediate movement).

EVACUATION ALERT – [HAZARD TYPE]

An Evacuation Alert has been issued for the following areas:

[List neighbourhoods or zones]

This means residents and visitors should be prepared to evacuate on short notice.

Actions to take now:

- Prepare essential items (medications, ID, pets);
- Check on neighbors who may need assistance; and
- Monitor official updates for further instructions.

Do not evacuate yet unless instructed. Updated will be provided as conditions change.

D.2 EVACUATION ORDER MESSAGE TEMPLATE

Use when: Trigger Level 3 – Evacuation Order (immediate life safety action required).

EVACUATION ORDER – EVACUATE IMMEDIATELY

An Evacuation Order has been issued for:

[List neighbourhoods or zones]

There is an immediate threat to life safety.

Evacuate immediately using the following method:

- Authorized route(s): [Route Name]

Do not delay. Do not return until advised it is safe.

If you require assistance evacuating, follow instructions provided by responders.

D.3 WILDFIRE EVACUATION MESSAGING ADD-ON

Use when: Evacuation Alerts or Orders during wildfire events (supports phased evacuation).

Evacuations may be conducted in phases to reduce congestion.

Please follow instructions for your ["neighbourhood" or "zone"] and do not use alternate routes unless directed.

Road conditions may change quickly due to smoke, fire activity, or debris.

D.4 FLOODING/ROAD CONDITION MESSAGING ADD-ON

Use when: Flooding or washouts are a concern.

Evacuation routes are subject to road assessments.

Only use authorized routes identified in official messaging.

Do not attempt to drive through flooded or damaged road sections.

D.5 MESSAGE CONTROL CHECKLIST

Table 34 prevents conflicting or unsafe messaging.

Table 34: Message Control Checklist

Check	Yes/No
Hazard type clearly identified	☐ Yes ☐ No
Neighbourhoods/zones clearly listed	☐ Yes ☐ No
Authorized routes confirmed	☐ Yes ☐ No
Language clear and non-technical	☐ Yes ☐ No
Consistent with EOC decisions	☐ Yes ☐ No

ANNEX E. ASSISTED EVACUATION AND VULNERABLE POPULATION TOOLS

This annex provides operational tools to support the identification, coordination, and tracking of individuals and groups who may require assistance during evacuation. The tools in this annex are intended to support the execution of assisted evacuation activities described in the main plan.

These tools are used to:

- Identify individuals or households requiring assistance;
- Coordinate transportation and support resources;
- Track assisted evacuation requests and outcomes; and
- Support situational awareness within the EOC during evacuation operations.

Use of these tools must remain aligned with current evacuation trigger levels, authorized routes, and EOC direction, and does not replace professional judgement or life-safety decision-making.

E.1 ASSISTED EVACUATION DECISION QUICK REFERENCE

- Prioritize life safety over completeness;
- Early evacuation is preferred for those requiring assistance;
- Do not delay evacuation awaiting perfect information;
- Coordinate assisted evacuation through the EOC where feasible; and
- Community support is encouraged where safe and appropriate.

E.2 ASSISTED EVACUATION REQUEST LOG

Table 35 allows field personnel and the EOC to track individuals or households requiring evacuation assistance.

Table 35: Assisted Evacuation Request Log

Request ID	Date/Time	Name/Location	Zone	Type of Assistance	Mobility Aids	Assigned Transport	Status	Notes
				☐ Ride ☐ Mobility ☐ Medical ☐ Other	☐ Walker ☐ Wheelchair ☐ None			
				☐ Ride ☐ Mobility ☐ Medical ☐ Other	☐ Walker ☐ Wheelchair ☐ None			
				☐ Ride ☐ Mobility ☐ Medical ☐ Other	☐ Walker ☐ Wheelchair ☐ None			

E.3 VULNERABLE POPULATION IDENTIFICATION SHEET

Table 36 identifies individuals who may require early evacuation or additional support.

Table 36: Vulnerable Population Identification Sheet

Name/Address	Zone	Vulnerability Type	Primary Contact	Notes
		☐ Elder ☐ Mobility ☐ Medical ☐ No Vehicle ☐ Other		
		☐ Elder ☐ Mobility ☐ Medical ☐ No Vehicle ☐ Other		
		☐ Elder ☐ Mobility ☐ Medical ☐ No Vehicle ☐ Other		

E.4 PICK-UP/MUSTER POINT TRACKING SHEET

Table 37 coordinates shared transportation and avoid missed pick-ups.

Table 37: Muster Point Tracking Sheet

Muster Point	Zone	Vehicle Assigned	Capacity	Time Dispatched	Status
					☐ Pending ☐ En-route ☐ Completed
					☐ Pending ☐ En-route ☐ Completed
					☐ Pending ☐ En-route ☐ Completed

E.5 TRANSPORTATION RESOURCE TRACKER

Table 38 coordinates available vehicles and drivers support evacuation.

Table 38: Transportation Resource Tracker

Resource ID	Vehicle Type	Driver	Capacity	Assigned Task	Availability
	☐ Van ☐ Bus ☐ Truck ☐ Boat				☐ Available ☐ Assigned ☐ Out of Service
	☐ Van ☐ Bus ☐ Truck ☐ Boat				☐ Available ☐ Assigned ☐ Out of Service
	☐ Van ☐ Bus ☐ Truck ☐ Boat				☐ Available ☐ Assigned ☐ Out of Service

ANNEX F. LIVESTOCK EVACUATION PLAN

This annex provides practical guidance to support the evacuation of livestock within the Pemberton Valley during emergency events. Livestock evacuation requires early decision-making, additional time, and coordination with route availability, and must be considered alongside human life-safety priorities.

F.1 SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS

- Livestock evacuation primarily applies to agricultural operations within the Pemberton Valley and surrounding rural areas;
- Livestock evacuation is voluntary and owner-led; however, advance planning and coordination improves safety outcomes;
- Evacuation feasibility is highly dependent on:
 - Warning time;
 - Availability of trailers and drivers; and
 - Route viability and congestion conditions.

F.2 EVACUATION TRIGGERS FOR LIVESTOCK

Livestock evacuation should be considered earlier than general population evacuation when:

- There is sufficient warning time (e.g., wildfire, flooding);
- Evacuation routes are confirmed as viable; and
- Delay may result in loss of access or isolation.

Where time does not permit evacuation, shelter-in-place measures may be required.

F.3 LIVESTOCK EVACUATION ACTIONS

Prior to Evacuation

- Identify animals to be evacuated and prioritize those requiring trailers or special handling;
- Secure trailer, vehicles, fuel, and drivers early; and
- Prepare animals for movement (halters, loading familiarity, identification).

During Evacuation

- Use only authorized evacuation routes as communicated by authorities;
- Avoid peak congestion periods where possible; and
- Coordinate movements to minimize interference with general evacuation traffic.

If Evacuation is Not Possible

- Move animals to areas with reduced hazard exposure where feasible;
- Provide access to water and clear escape paths; and
- Remove flammable materials from immediate surroundings where safe to do so.

F.4 COORDINATION AND INFORMATION SHARING

- Livestock owners are encouraged to self-coordinate transport and destination arrangements;
- Information regarding livestock needs, large movements, or trailer convoys should be communicated to the EOC where feasible to support traffic management; and
- Animal welfare organizations and agricultural networks may provide limited support when available.

F.5 PUBLIC MESSAGING CONSIDERATIONS

Evacuation messaging should:

- Encourage early livestock evacuation when conditions allow;
- Reinforce that human life-safety remains the priority; and
- Provide clear direction on authorized routes and timing constraints.

F.6 LIMITATIONS

- Emergency responders may have limited capacity to assist with livestock evacuation;
- Livestock evacuation may not be feasible during rapid-onset or late-stage events; and
- Decisions must balance animal welfare with overall evacuation safety and route functionality.

ANNEX G. ACRONYMS

Table 39 summarizes the acronyms associated with this plan.

Table 39: Acronyms

Acronym	Definition
BCWS	BC Wildfire Services
EDMA	Emergency Disaster Management Act
EMCR	Emergency Management and Climate Readiness
EOC	Emergency Operations Centre
EPC	Emergency Program Coordinator
ERP	Emergency Response Plan
ESS	Emergency Support Services
FN	First Nations
HRVA	Hazard, Risk, and Vulnerability Analysis
IC	Incident Commander
MOTT	Ministry of Transportation and Transit
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PAWS	Pemberton Animal Well-being Society
PSAR	Pemberton Search and Rescue
PVDD	Pemberton Valley Dyking District
RC	Reception Centre
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
SLRD	Squamish-Lillooet Regional District
VCH	Vancouver Coastal Health

VOP	Village of Pemberton
WLRS	BC Ministry of Water, Land, and Resource Stewardship
WUI	Wildland-Urban Interface